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Abstract 
 
We provide new evidence that differences in international tax rates and tax regimes affect 
multinational firms’ debt location decisions. Our sample contains 8,287 debt issues from 2,437 
firms headquartered in 23 different countries with debt-issuing subsidiaries in 59 countries. We 
analyze firms’ marginal decisions of where to issue debt to investigate the influence of a 
comprehensive set of tax-related effects, including differences in personal and corporate tax 
rates, tax credit and exemption systems, and bi-lateral cross-country withholding taxes on 
interest and dividend payments. Our results show that differences in personal and corporate tax 
rates, the presence of dividend imputation or relief tax systems, the tax treatment of repatriated 
profits, and inter-country withholding taxes on dividends and interest significantly influence the 
decision of where to locate debt and the proportion of debt located abroad.  Our results are robust 
to firm and issue specific factors and to the effect of legal regimes, debt market development, 
and exchange rate risk. 
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The Effect of Taxes on Multinational Debt Location  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite numerous empirical studies dealing with firms’ capital structure choice in 
international debt markets, the prior literature has yet to fully consider the broad array of tax 
factors that theory predicts can influence a multinational firm’s decision of where to locate debt.  
Prior studies, such as Desai et al. (2004) and Huizinga et al. (2008), have examined tax-related 
effects on firms’ multinational capital structure decision.  However, these studies consider only a 
subset of tax-related incentives that could influence the corporate debt location decision.  
Moreover, these studies use debt-related information for firms headquartered in a limited set of 
developed countries with many institutional similarities.  Absent a more comprehensive 
investigation of tax-related incentives, the literature’s understanding of the theoretical tax-related 
benefits of debt financing remains limited.   
This study aims to increase the literature’s understanding by considering a broader set of 
tax-related incentives of debt finance facing multinational firms located in disparate institutional 
settings. Specifically, we examine the impact of differences in corporate and personal tax rates 
and tax regimes on multinational firms’ marginal decisions of whether to issue debt at home 
through the parent or a domestic subsidiary or abroad through a foreign subsidiary.   Our analysis 
uses a unique dataset consisting of 8,287 debt issues between 1995 and 2004 from 2,437 firms 
headquartered in 23 different countries with debt-issuing subsidiaries in a total of 59 countries.  
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Combined, this study’s investigation of the tax-related incentives facing multinational firms 
provide a richer, more complete analysis of the influence of taxes on a firm’s decision of where 
to locate debt.  
We find that tax factors significantly affect multinational firms’ decisions of where to 
locate debt as well as the proportion of debt that they locate abroad.  Specifically, we find that a 
multinational firm is more likely to issue debt abroad when the firm’s foreign subsidiary is 
located in a country in which debt capital is afforded a greater tax advantage, as measured by a 
proxy of the Miller (1977) gains-to-leverage formula (“debt tax gain”), and when the tax code 
permits dividend imputation or dividend relief.  Our results on dividend imputation and relief are 
particularly noteworthy since, as noted by Graham (2008), as of today the effect of these 
dividend tax systems on debt location is empirically unknown despite their potentially significant 
influence in multinational capital structure decisions.  We also find that firms are more likely to 
issue debt through foreign subsidiaries in high corporate tax countries when the parent country 
adopts an exemption system on repatriated profits from subsidiaries.
1
  Moreover, we show that 
the proportion of the total amount of debt issued by multinational firms via their foreign 
subsidiaries increases relative to the tax advantage of debt in the subsidiary’s country and also 
depends on the presence of inter-country withholding taxes on interest income and dividends.   
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that multinational firms locate debt in tax-
advantaged countries in order to capture positive valuation effects and are robust after 
                                                 
1
 While there exists some empirical evidence on the effect of the US tax credit system on debt location decisions by 
US corporations (e.g., Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001)), our study is the first to investigate the effect of the tax 
exemption system (which is currently adopted by the great majority of countries in the world) on the location debt 
decision. 
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controlling for a multitude of other factors.  Our results display strong economic significance.  
For example, a firm headquartered in a country with dividend imputation and exemption tax 
systems and “debt tax gain” at the 25th percentile is 41.5% more likely to issue debt in a country 
with a classical dividend tax system and “debt tax gain” at the 75th percentile than in a country 
with a dividend imputation tax system and “debt tax gain” at the 25th percentile. 
These findings result from an empirical analysis of the tax incentives on corporate debt 
policy that has increased power over previous studies on international capital structure and 
corporate debt location choices (e.g., Booth et al. (2001), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1988), Fan et al. (2008), Desai et al. (2004), and Huizinga et al. (2008)).
2
  First, we examine the 
within-firm variation in the decision of where to locate debt (i.e., domestic parent or subsidiary 
versus foreign subsidiary).  Thus, our sample provides a natural control for firm-level variation 
that may influence capital structure decisions and are less likely to suffer from omitted variable 
biases.  
Second, our sample examines the incremental marginal decision of where to locate debt 
as opposed to the extent of foreign versus domestic debt that exists within a firm’s capital 
structure.  Much of the prior literature that examines the effect of taxes of firms’ debt to equity 
ratios uses available balance sheet information of firms located in different countries.  By 
focusing on the marginal decision of where to locate debt, our tests provide more power to 
identify effects that are determined at the margin, such as taxes (MacKie-Mason (1990) and 
Graham (1996)).  Moreover, the incremental approach links the borrowing decision of the firm 
                                                 
2
 As noted by Graham (1996), Auerbach (2002), and Graham (2003), the estimation of the sensitivity of capital 
structure to tax incentives has proven challenging. 
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with variables measured prior to the debt issuance, allowing an analysis of the effect of time-
variation in tax factors on the debt location choice.
3
   
Third, we consider a more comprehensive set of possible tax effects than the prior 
literature.  Our data contain detailed information on country-level corporate and personal income 
tax rates; inter-country dividend and interest withholding tax rates; a distinction between tax 
credit and exemption systems on repatriated profits from foreign subsidiaries; as well as 
categorical information regarding tax regimes, i.e., dividend relief versus dividend imputation 
regimes. 
Finally, our data aggregate firm- and country-specific information across a variety of 
sources in order to control for possible additional explanations of multinational firms’ decisions 
of where to locate debt.  For example, our data merge information from Thomson Financial’s 
Security Data Corporation’s (“SDC”) Global New Issues Database, Compustat Global, annual 
publications of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (“PwC”) Corporate Taxes a Worldwide Summary, 
LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations, the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, among others.  Combined, our 
data contain contract-related information (e.g., issue size and issue type), firm-specific 
accounting information at the parent and subsidiary level (e.g., firm size, leverage, and 
profitability), and information related to country-level differences in credit markets, legal 
environments, and interest rate or exchange rate risk environments.  To our knowledge, the data 
of this study is the most comprehensive in the literature in terms of the number of countries 
                                                 
3
 Denis and Mihov (2003),  Arena and Howe (2009), and Arena (2010) use a similar approach to analyze the public-
private debt choice for U.S. firms. 
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studied, the number of firms considered, and the level of tax-related and institutional-related 
information.   
While not the focus of this paper, our tests also consider additional motives for locating 
debt abroad.  In particular, we show that companies are more likely to issue debt abroad through 
subsidiaries that post high profits relative to their parents’ reported consolidated profits. We find 
multinationals headquartered in countries with developed debt markets are less likely to issue 
debt abroad.  We also find that multinational firms headquartered in common law countries are 
less likely to issue debt through foreign subsidiaries, especially if these foreign subsidiaries are 
located in civil law countries or in countries with poorer rule of law.  Conversely, multinational 
firms headquartered in civil law countries are more likely to issue debt through foreign 
subsidiaries whenever the subsidiary is located in a common law country.  These findings are 
consistent with the hypotheses that firms locate debt in subsidiaries that have higher potential tax 
benefits to debt, and that firms are willing to commit to more restrictive standards for corporate 
governance by issuing debt in international markets (Harvey et al. (2004)), and that firms attempt 
to arbitrage differences in the cost of debt finance resulting from international differences in 
credit market institutions (Noe (2000) and Titman (2002)).  In addition, we show that debt 
location choice is also explained by the exchange rate risk.  A company is more likely to issue 
debt through a subsidiary located in a foreign country with higher exchange rate risk than the 
parent country.  This result is consistent with the hypothesis that firms locate debt in countries in 
an attempt to hedge the impact of foreign exchange movements on operating results. 
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Of the studies that examine debt policy within multinational firms, Desai et al. (2004) and 
Huizinga et al. (2008) are the most related.
4
  Using affiliate level data for U.S. multinationals, 
Desai et al. (2004) provide evidence that higher local tax rates are correlated with affiliate-level 
higher debt-to-asset ratios.  Huizinga et al. (2008) document the ability of differences in 
international tax rates to explain the cross-sectional variation of leverage ratios observed in 
European firms.   
In contrast to these papers, we examine the impact of taxes on multinational firms’ 
marginal decision of where to locate debt using an analysis of the within-firm variation in debt 
issue location.  We also investigate for the first time in the literature the effect of personal taxes, 
withholding taxes on interest income, tax credit and exemption systems, and dividend imputation 
and dividend relief tax regimes on the debt location choice.  Moreover, we greatly extend prior 
samples to include firms from both developed and developing markets.  Finally, we examine tax-
based incentives on the choice of debt location while controlling for a broader set of factors that 
may also be related to location choice.  Combined, these contributions allow us to provide new 
evidence that broadens our understanding of the impact of corporate taxes and the corporate tax 
environment on a firm’s debt location choice. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the empirical questions 
related to the tax factors that may affect a multinational firm’s decision of where to locate debt.  
Section 3 outlines our sample selection requirements and provides summary statistics and 
                                                 
4
 Other related studies that examine the tax incentives to debt location in multinational corporations are Chowdhry 
and Nanda (1994), Chowdhry and Coval (1998), Newberry (1998), and Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001). 
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univariate analysis.  Section 4 provides our multivariate analysis of factors that determine a 
firm’s choice of where to locate debt.  Section 5 reports robustness checks.  Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Taxes and the Decision of Where to Issue Debt 
In this section we present our tax-related empirical questions and describe the variables 
used in our empirical analysis to investigate those questions. 
2.1.   Net Tax Advantage of Domestic Debt to Foreign Debt Due to Corporate and Personal 
Taxes 
Differences in corporate and personal tax rates across countries can impact a firm’s 
decision of where to locate debt.  Hodder and Senbet (1990) demonstrate that when debt markets 
are not fully integrated, a Miller-type equilibrium results within each country while a pecking 
order results across national debt capital markets.  However, if investors can freely move in and 
out of debt capital markets across different countries, investors’ demand schedules for corporate 
debt can be aggregated across countries and taxes may not have a significant impact on a firm’s 
choice of where to locate debt.  Thus, whether or not taxes matter is an empirical question.  
Ceteris paribus, we conjecture that multinational corporations are more likely to offer debt in the 
countries with the highest net tax advantage to debt, where the net tax advantage includes the 
effects of both corporate and personal tax rates. 
For example, consider a firm that has a subsidiary located in a foreign country.  Both the 
parent and subsidiary generate taxable income.  Assume interest payments on corporate debt are 
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deductible against corporate income in both the foreign and domestic countries and that the 
corporate tax rates are Domestic
C
T  and 
Foreign
C
T  in the domestic and foreign countries respectively,
Foreign
C
Domestic
C
TT  .  Conditional on issuing debt, the net tax advantage of paying $1 of interest in 
country A, as opposed to country B, is TA - TB.
5
  Thus, all else equal, the firm has a relative tax 
advantage to issuing foreign debt relative to domestic debt due to differences in country-level 
corporate taxes.      
The introduction of country-level personal taxes into the above hypothetical attenuates 
but does not eliminate the relative benefit to issuing foreign debt.  This assumes that there exist 
frictions across markets such that country-level issuer demand for debt and country-level supply 
of debt capital do not aggregate into singular demand and supply curves for the world market for 
debt.  As noted by Miller (1977), if the domestic country investor-level personal taxes on interest 
income are large relative to its tax rate on corporate income, the domestic country’s relative tax 
advantage can be zero or even negative, all else equal.
6
  In general, one can compare the relative 
tax advantage to issuing debt in the domestic country versus the foreign country by comparing 
the outcome of the Miller (1977) gains to leverage formula across the two scenarios.
7
  Assume 
                                                 
5
 In practice, there may exist additional factors, outside the scope of this study, other than statutory tax rates that can 
affect the tax advantage of debt.  For example, non-debt tax shields such as a firm’s depreciation expense or tax loss 
carryforwards, and interest expense allocation rules can also affect a firm’s decision to issue debt to the extent that 
they change a firm’s marginal tax rate.   
6
 We consider the tax effect on debt investors residing outside the subsidiary country or parent country by analyzing 
the effect of withholding taxes on interest as described in the following section. 
7
 In tabulated results, we do not consider personal taxes on capital gains in our empirical application of the Miller’s 
gains to leverage formula because in our sample the average parent ownership of subsidiaries is 92% and the great 
majority of foreign subsidiaries (84%) are fully owned by the parent.  Therefore in most cases there is not tradable 
subsidiary equity.  Nonetheless, we have, in untabulated results, verified that our conclusions do not change if our 
Relative Debt Tax Gain variable is defined to include the impact of capital gains tax rates. 
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the interest income is taxed at the same rate as personal income, identified as Domestic
P
T  and 
Foreign
P
T .  Conditional of issuing debt, there exists a relative tax advantage to issuing debt in the 
foreign country whenever the following condition holds: 
(1) 
)1(
)1(
1
)1(
)1(
1
Foreign
P
Foreign
C
Domestic
P
Domestic
C
T
T
T
T





  
In our empirical analysis, we proxy for the relative tax advantage to issuing debt in the 
foreign country using the difference of the Miller (1997) gains-to-leverage ratio between the 
foreign subsidiary and the parent.  This variable is labeled “Relative Debt Tax Gain.”  We create 
a proxy for Tc using the maximum corporate tax rate reported for the parent’s (subsidiary’s) 
country of residence in PricewaterhouseCoopers’s (“PwC”) Corporate Taxes a Worldwide 
Summary in the year prior to the debt offering.  We also create a proxy for TP using the 
maximum personal income tax rate reported in PwC’s Individual Taxes a Worldwide Summary 
in the year prior to the debt offering for the parent’s (subsidiary’s) country of residence.   
2.2.  The Effect of Dividend Imputation and Dividend Relief Systems 
In addition to the level of corporate and personal taxes, the tax treatments of dividend 
payments may be an important factor that influences a multinational firm’s decision of where to 
locate debt.  According to Fan et al. (2008), in the classical tax system dividend, payments are 
taxed at both the corporate and personal levels and interest payments are tax-deductible at the 
corporate level.  The dividend relief tax system differs from the classical tax system in respect to 
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the taxing of dividend payments, i.e., either dividends are not taxed at the corporate level or they 
are taxed at a reduced rate at the personal level.  In dividend imputation tax systems, firms can 
deduct interest expenses at the corporate level, and domestic corporate taxes paid are distributed 
to taxable resident shareholders as a tax credit with dividend payments. 
In the case of multinational corporations, deciding where to locate debt may vary 
according to the local dividend tax regime that applies to the parent and its subsidiary.  For 
foreign subsidiaries that operate in dividend tax regimes in which after-tax cost of debt is more 
costly relative to equity (i.e., dividend imputation or dividend relief tax systems), the incentive to 
use debt finance is lower and multinational corporations will be less likely to consider issuing 
debt through these foreign subsidiaries.  In this study we hypothesize that multinational 
corporations located in a country with a classical dividend tax system are less likely to locate 
debt in countries that adopt dividend imputation or dividend relief tax systems. 
Following Fan et al. (2008), we classify Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United States as classical 
tax regimes; Sweden and Thailand as dividend relief tax regimes; and Australia, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom as 
dividend imputation tax regimes.  In our empirical analysis, we control for differences in tax rate 
regimes by creating a variable, “Relative Dividend Imputation,” that equals one if the tax regime 
in the foreign country is a dividend imputation based system but the parent country is not; zero if 
both countries have tax regimes that are either dividend imputation systems or not; and minus 
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one if the parent country is a dividend imputation system, but the foreign country is not.  The 
variable “Relative Dividend Relief” is defined similarly. 
2.3.   The Effect of Inter-Country Withholding Tax Rates on Dividends and Interest 
In addition to the above tax considerations, the domestic and foreign treatment of 
repatriated interest payments and dividend income may also influence the tax advantage of debt 
for a multinational firm and its debt location decision.  For example, even though debt issued 
abroad may lower the foreign subsidiary’s taxable income that is subject to the foreign country’s 
corporate tax rate, any tax benefit to the parent may be affected if the foreign subsidiary must 
also pay withholding taxes on interest or dividend payments made to its domestic parent 
(Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001), and Graham (2003)).  Thus, the relative tax advantage of 
issuing debt abroad or at home is a function not only of the corporate, personal tax rates and 
dividend tax systems within a country, but also the tax treatment of repatriated interest and 
dividend payments for transfers between countries. 
Withholding taxes on dividend payments are usually levied by the subsidiary country on 
outgoing dividend payments used by the subsidiary to transfer income across borders to the 
parent company (Huizinga et al. (2008)).  This can lead to additional incentive to issue debt 
through subsidiaries located in countries that have high dividend withholding rates.  Since 
withholding taxes on dividends are in essence an additional corporate tax on income, we 
conjecture that multinational firms will be more likely to issue debt through subsidiaries located 
in countries with high withholding tax rates on dividends. 
12 
 
Withholding taxes on interest payments made to foreign investors can create a tax-
advantage for foreign investors to substitute foreign for domestic-issued bonds.  Since foreign 
withholding taxes on interest payments are in addition to domestic personal income taxes, 
investors may also demand higher rates of return for investing in bonds issued by foreign 
companies (Kim and Stulz (1992)), creating differences in borrowing costs associated with 
foreign and domestic debt offerings.  We conjecture that multinational corporations will be less 
likely to issue debt through subsidiaries located in countries characterized by high withholding 
tax rates on interest. 
We create a proxy for withholding tax rates on interest and dividend income using the 
withholding tax rates reported in PwC’s Corporate Taxes a Worldwide Summary for the year 
prior to the debt issue.  Whenever available, we use the maximum withholding rate specified by 
the bi-lateral treaty between the country in which the foreign subsidiary operates and the country 
in which the parent is domiciled.  If no treaty exists, we use the maximum withholding rate for 
non-treaty countries.  To our knowledge, our paper is the first to exploit detailed world-wide data 
on both interest and dividend withholding taxes. 
2.4. The Effect of Exemption and Tax-Credit Systems on Multinational Firms’ Profits 
Repatriation 
Taxes levied by the parent country on repatriated profits from foreign subsidiaries vary 
depending on the domicile country of the parent company.  The majority of countries around the 
world adopt an exemption system (also known as territorial system).  Under this system the 
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parent country taxes a firm only on profits earned at home.  Foreign subsidiaries’ profits 
repatriated as dividends are exempt.  United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Ireland, Mexico, 
Poland, and South Korea adopt instead a tax-credit system (also known as worldwide system).
8
  
Under this system, parent countries tax corporate profits earned outside the parent country.  If the 
foreign tax rate is smaller than the domestic corporate tax rate, a firm pays taxes to the foreign 
country on subsidiary income and then pays the remaining difference (taxdomestic-taxforeign) to the 
parent country. Such firm is usually referred as “deficit credit” firm.  If, instead, the foreign tax 
rate is larger than the domestic tax rate, a firm pays taxes to the foreign country on subsidiary 
income and then receives a credit on the difference (taxforeign-taxdomestic) by the parent country. 
Such firm is referred as an “excess credit” firm (Graham (2008)). 
It is important to notice that multinational firms are likely to keep foreign subsidiary 
profits in the foreign country for operational and investing needs.  That is especially true for 
“deficit credit” firms with parents domiciled in tax-credit system countries.  Therefore we expect 
that, in normal circumstances, the prediction advanced in section 2.1 holds independently on the 
profit repatriation tax system.  However, we also expect that, everything else constant, firms with 
parents domiciled in exemption system countries should be even more likely to issue debt abroad 
in countries with high corporate tax rates.  In our empirical analysis we include a dummy 
variable equal to one if the parent country adopts an exemption system and the subsidiary 
country has a corporate tax rate higher than the parent country, and zero otherwise.  We call this 
variable “Exemption System”. 
                                                 
8
 United Kingdom and Japan shifted from a tax-credit to an exemption system in 2008, outside our sample period. 
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3.  Sample and Univariate Analysis 
3.1. Sample Selection 
The sample combines consolidated data from financial statements of the parent company, 
financial accounting data of subsidiaries when available, various country-level proxies, and debt 
issuance information for the parent and its domestic and foreign subsidiaries.  We compile the 
sample as follows.  From Compustat Global, we collect financial accounting data of non-U.S., 
non-financial companies with consolidated accounting statements.  From Thomson Financial’s 
Security Data Corporation (“SDC”) Global New Issues Database (SDC Global New Issue), we 
extract public and private debt issues from the international Euro market and syndicated banking 
markets, foreign bond markets in the U.S. and abroad (e.g., Matadors, Samurai, and Bulldog 
bonds), and 45 domestic markets.
9
  From SDC we also collect financial statement information 
pertaining to the issuing subsidiaries when available.
10
  We merge the two samples by parent 
company name (SDC Global New Issue’s data field, “issuer borrower ultimate parent name”) 
and by parent country (SDC Global New Issue’s data field, “issuer borrower ultimate parent 
country”).  From this merge, we keep only those issues that have consolidated financial 
accounting data in the year preceding the debt issue.  In addition, we collect data on the location 
                                                 
9
 See Henderson et al. (2006) for a thorough description of the international coverage of  the SDC Global New 
Issues database.     
10
 SDC provides subsidiary-level accounting data (such as assets, debt, earnings, and revenues) for 19% of the 
issuing subsidiaries in our sample. 
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and number of foreign subsidiaries (both issuing and non-issuing) from LexisNexis Corporate 
Affiliations when available.
11
 
The resulting dataset consists of 8,287 debt issues from 2,437 firms headquartered in 23 
countries during the sample period 1995 to 2004.  The sample includes firms that issue debt 
solely through the parent company as well as firms that issue debt through either domestic or 
foreign subsidiaries, or both.  Firms that issue debt through foreign subsidiaries make up at least 
15% of the firms within the sample, 19% of the total number of issues, and 24% of the aggregate 
issuance volume.  Among the sample firms covered by Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations, about 
75% have at least one subsidiary and about 62% have at least one foreign subsidiary for an 
average of 14 subsidiaries for firms.   
We note that SDC’s coverage of debt market issues differs from country to country.  For 
some countries (such as Australia), SDC collects data from statutory filings to regulatory bodies.  
For other countries (such as Asian Pacific countries), SDC relies on data from multiple informal 
sources (e.g., wires, news sources, trade publications, foreign stock exchange filings, and 
proprietary surveys).  Therefore, the sampling of debt issues may be more comprehensive for 
some countries than others.  As argued by  Henderson et al. (2006), the noise in the data due to 
this variation in coverage, if anything, may bias our tests against finding evidence of tax effects 
on multinational debt location decisions.  
SDC does not report intercompany loans. However, our empirical investigation does not 
necessitate intercompany loan issuance data.  In this study we focus our analysis on firms’ 
                                                 
11
 LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations provides subsidiary data for about 60% of our sample firms. 
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decision of where to locate new external debt to either raise new capital or refinance maturing 
debt.  Intercompany loans shift capital (possibly even previously issued debt) between the parent 
and its subsidiaries and are encompassed in studies which investigate parent and subsidiary 
leverage levels (i.e., Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)).  Since we investigate how international 
taxation influences the firm’s external debt issuing decision at the time of the issuance, 
intercompany loans are not a primary concern of our study.  
Our sample does not include corporations headquartered in the U.S.  The inclusion of 
firms headquartered in the U.S. would result in a sample heavily influenced by the issuing 
behavior of U.S. parents because the number of debt issues and the quantity of debt issued by 
U.S. companies during our sample period is larger than that totality of our non-U.S. debt sample.  
This would limit our ability to interpret our results at an international level.  We note, however, 
that even though we exclude U.S. parent companies, our sample does include debt issuances 
from subsidiaries located in the U.S. of non-U.S. multinational firms.  Therefore our sample 
includes U.S. country-level data.  Our study intends to complement the Desai et al. (2004) study 
which focuses exclusively on the debt location decision of U.S. parent multinationals.     
3.2.  Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides detailed information on the number of issues and number of issuers by 
country of origin of the parent company and by issuing entity (e.g., parent versus subsidiary 
issue).  Our data include a significant number of both parent and subsidiary level issues (4,998 
parent and 3,289 subsidiary).  We separate subsidiary level issues into issues from domestic 
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subsidiaries and from foreign subsidiaries.  We classify all subsidiaries that operate in countries 
other than the parent country as foreign subsidiaries. 
Over the sample period, subsidiaries issued almost 40% of the total number of debt issues 
in international marketplaces.  Within the sample, Japanese-based firms are heavily represented 
and account for almost 40% (42%) of the total number of debt issues (firms).  Among parent 
companies headquartered in different countries, there is significant variation in the use of 
subsidiary debt.  Parents located in Thailand raise external debt through subsidiaries the least 
(25% of their total issues) and German firms locate debt in subsidiaries most often (80% of their 
total issues). 
Within our sample of 3,289 subsidiary debt issues, 1,548 (47%) are foreign subsidiary 
debt issues.  Similar to our finding above, Japanese firms are heavily represented and account for 
just over 41% of the total number of issues from foreign subsidiaries.  Among countries, there is 
significant variation in the use of foreign subsidiary debt.  Parents located in Thailand raise 
external debt through foreign subsidiaries the least (2.6% of their total subsidiary issues) while 
Swiss firms locate debt in foreign subsidiaries most often (82% of their total subsidiary issues).  
We exploit this variation in our multivariate analysis. 
 The extent to which firms locate debt domestically through a domestic subsidiary or the 
parent or abroad though foreign subsidiaries is the focal point of this study.  However, the reader 
may be interested in the types of debt contracts that are most likely to be raised through 
subsidiaries.  In the sample, 43% (42%) of the total number of issues of straight debt (syndicated 
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term loans) are issued by subsidiaries.  Convertible debt is most often issued by the parent 
company.  Only 17% of all convertible debt issues are issued by a subsidiary.
12
 
 Table 2 presents information on the number of issues and number of issuers by foreign 
subsidiary country.  The foreign subsidiaries that issue debt during our sample period are located 
in 59 countries.  Within the sample, the country in which the largest number of foreign 
subsidiaries issue debt is the United States (102 subsidiaries issuing debt 547 times).  That is 
companies with parents located outside the U.S. locate debt frequently through U.S. based 
foreign subsidiaries.   
Table 3 presents issue characteristics by issuing entity (i.e., parent, domestic subsidiary, 
or foreign subsidiary).  Within the sample, we find that debt issues by foreign subsidiaries have 
significantly larger principal than issues by domestic firms (either parent companies or domestic 
subsidiaries).  Larger corporations, which issue larger amounts of debt, might be more likely to 
own foreign subsidiaries and to issue debt through these subsidiaries. When we control for firm 
size and other firm characteristics in our multivariate analysis, in fact, we do not find a positive 
relation between issuing through a foreign subsidiary and issue size. 
Debt issued by foreign subsidiaries also has significantly longer dated maturities than 
debt issued by domestic subsidiaries or parent companies.  In an untabulated analysis, we 
disaggregate issue-specific information by debt type (straight bonds, convertible bonds, and 
loans).  This analysis shows that the difference in issue size and maturity between issues by 
                                                 
12
 Our sample consists of 4,666 (56%) public and private bonds, 1,139 (14%) convertible bonds, and 2,482 (30%) 
term loans.  Detailed univariate statistics about the distribution of issues by debt type are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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domestic firms and foreign subsidiaries holds for straight and convertible bonds, but not for bank 
loans. 
Table 4 provides issue-level summary statistics for our proxies of tax-based incentives.  
The table reports means and medians of our tax-based variables by issuer entity.  The first 
column identifies parent-level issues and tabulates the summary statistics using parent country 
information.  The second column identifies debt issued by subsidiaries located in the same 
country of the parent.  In this column, the summary statistics report parent country information.  
The next two columns identify external debt issued by foreign subsidiaries and provide summary 
statistics of country-level tax variables for the parent country and foreign subsidiary country, 
respectively.  The last column presents p-values of two-sample t-tests of the mean and Wilcoxon 
tests of the median for the values presented in the previous two columns. 
From these univariate summary statistics, we find preliminary evidence which suggests 
that differences in tax rates and regimes are related to firms’ debt location decision.  The p-
values of the differences presented in the last column show that firms that issue debt in foreign 
subsidiaries have significantly higher gains to leverage measured using either the Debt Tax Gain 
(a proxy that ignores the impact of personal capital gains taxes) or the Miller Gaines-to-Leverage 
(a proxy that includes the impact of personal capital gains taxes).  The significant difference in 
“Debt Tax Gain” between foreign subsidiaries’ countries and parents’ countries appears to be 
driven by differences in personal income taxes between parent and foreign subsidiary countries 
rather than by differences in corporate taxes. 
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We also find that multinational corporations that locate debt in foreign subsidiaries are on 
average more likely to have parents domiciled in countries that employ dividend imputation as 
opposed to the foreign subsidiary (40% versus 22%).  This result is consistent with our 
hypothesis on dividend tax regimes.  Since tax systems that employ dividend imputation tend to 
decrease the relative tax benefit of debt, multinational corporations may preferentially issue debt 
in countries that do not adopt this type of tax regime. 
Table 5 provides issue-level summary statistics of various firm-level attributes that may 
be related to a firm’s debt location decision.  We measure all firm-level controls using parent-
level information available in the year preceding the debt issue.  The data indicate that on a 
consolidated accounting basis, multinational corporations that borrow through foreign 
subsidiaries tend to be significantly larger and more levered, to have lower asset tangibility, 
lower effective tax rates, and longer asset maturity.  It may be the case that both the parent and 
foreign subsidiaries of larger firms are more recognizable to international investors.  In this case, 
larger multinational corporations face lower costs of asymmetric information when issuing 
through foreign subsidiaries and thus face lower costs of borrowing through foreign subsidiaries 
in certain marketplaces.
13
  We note that our classification of parent and domestic subsidiary 
issues includes multinational firms that issue domestically.  The presence of multinational firms 
in the issue-level summary statistics for parent and domestic subsidiaries in Table 5 biases the 
                                                 
13
 Consider CEMEX.  CEMEX is headquartered in Mexico, but also operates foreign subsidiaries in the U.S.  
Comparing the cost of debt capital across both markets, CEMEX may decide to issue debt in the U.S.  In order to 
minimize the cost of debt finance, CEMEX borrows through its U.S. affiliate so that the affiliate can pledge capital 
that can be seized in the event of default by U.S. creditors.  Since CEMEX is large and well recognized by U.S. 
investors, they are willing to borrow through the affiliate. 
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data against finding a significant difference in firm-level attributes between domestic and foreign 
issues. 
Table 6 presents correlations among the variables used in the multivariate analysis.  As 
expected, firm size is highly correlated with issue size, leverage, and the number of foreign 
subsidiaries.  Among the tax variables, Relative Debt Tax Gain is highly negatively correlated 
with Relative Personal Taxes while Relative Miller Gains-to-Leverage is highly positively 
correlated with Relative Capital Gain Tax because of the way these variables are constructed.  
Relative Debt Tax Gain is also highly correlated with Relative Miller Gains-to-Leverage.  Even 
though in our main regressions we use Relative Debt Tax Gain, in untabulated regressions we 
substitute it with Relative Miller Gains-to-Leverage obtaining very similar results. 
4.  Multivariate Analysis 
4.1.  Multivariate Analysis of the Decision of Where to Locate Debt 
In Table 7, we present a logistic analysis of the corporate debt location choice.  The 
dependent variable in the logistic regression is zero if the debt is issued by either the parent or a 
domestic subsidiary and one if it is issued by a foreign subsidiary.  The right hand side variables 
include the Relative Debt Tax Gain, Relative Dividend Imputation, Relative Dividend Relief  
and Exemption System variables, as well as various issue-level, firm-level, and country-level 
controls (described in the Appendix).  We cannot include our Interest and Dividend Withholding 
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Tax variables in these regressions because they predict issues by foreign subsidiary perfectly.
14
  
Finally, in each regression model, we also include year and firm fixed effects. 
The first column of Table 7 examines tax-based incentives of debt location in 
multinational corporations.  Consistent with Hodder and Senbet (1990), we find that firms are 
more likely to locate debt in a foreign subsidiary when the foreign subsidiary operates in a tax 
environment that provides for greater tax advantage of debt as measured by the Relative Debt 
Tax Gain variable.  Desai et al. (2004) and Huizinga et al. (2008) also find multinational debt 
location choice is affected by taxes.  However, they consider only corporate taxes.  Our measure, 
Relative Debt Tax Gain, includes the impact of personal taxes on income as well corporate taxes 
and thus provides more comprehensive support for tax-based motives in debt location.   
The coefficient of the Relative Dividend Imputation is negative and significant.  This 
result suggests that multinational firms headquartered in countries with a dividend imputation 
system are more likely to issue debt through a subsidiary located in a country without dividend 
imputation taxation where the after-tax cost of debt is lower relative to equity.  The Exemption 
System indicator variable is positive and significant suggesting, consistent with our hypothesis, 
that corporations with parents in countries that adopt the exemption system for repatriated profits 
are more likely to issue debt through foreign subsidiary in countries with higher corporate taxes, 
everything else constant. 
                                                 
14
 When the dependent variable is zero (domestic issues), the withholding variables are always equal to zero; and 
when the dependent variable is one (foreign issues), the withholding variables are always equal or larger than zero.  
We include the withholding variables in the regressions presented in Table 7. 
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In the second column of Table 7, we expand our logistic regression to control for the 
possible influence that issue-level and firm-level characteristics may have on the decision of 
where to locate debt.  Consistent with Table 5, the coefficients of our firm-level characteristics 
show that larger and more profitable firms are more likely to issue debt through a foreign 
subsidiary.  Companies with more tangible assets are more likely to issue debt domestically.  
Domestic issues are usually larger and convertible debt is more likely to be issued domestically 
while loans are more likely to be used by foreign subsidiaries.  Even controlling for issue-level 
and firm-level variables, we still find that multinational firms are more likely to locate debt in a 
foreign subsidiary when the foreign subsidiary operates in a tax environment that provides for 
greater tax advantage of debt. 
In the third column of Table 7, we also include our subsidiary-level variables.  In order to 
include subsidiary-level data, which is available only for one fifth of our sample, we apply a 
method often used to avoid losing observations with missing financial statement variables (e.g., 
Palia (2001) and Fama and French (2002)). This method consists of setting the missing 
subsidiary-level variable values to zero and introducing indicator variables that are set to unity 
for the missing observations.  With this approach we are able to exploit the statistical power 
offered by our overall sample for most of our variables while analyzing the effect of subsidiary-
level data when available. 
The results of this regression show that companies are more likely to issue debt through a 
foreign subsidiary when the subsidiary has a higher profitability that the overall company, as 
indicated by the coefficient of the Sub/Parent ROA variable.  Considering that companies that 
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repatriate foreign profits might face double taxation (the foreign country taxes and withholding 
taxes on dividends in absence of a bi-lateral tax treaty), it is in the interest of these firms to shield 
high foreign subsidiary profits with more debt in comparison to domestic subsidiary profits.  
Overall, the results of this column show that, even controlling for subsidiary-level data, the 
significance of our tax variable, Relative Debt Tax Gain, persist. 
In addition to tax considerations and firm-specific characteristics, a multinational 
corporation’s decision of where to locate debt may also be related to differences in legal 
protection (La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1998)), credit market depth (Titman (2002)), 
and exchange rate risk (Shapiro (1984)).  While not the focus of this study, we control for these 
factors in our multivariate analysis. 
As a proxy for the legal regime in a country, we use country-level dummies indicating 
whether a country’s legal system is based upon common law.  We identify common law 
countries in our dataset following La Porta et al. (1997).  To examine rule of law, the second 
determinant of the legal protection provided by a country, we use the rule of law indicator 
created by La Porta et al. (1998).  To proxy for the credit market depth, we measure the ratio of a 
country’s net deposits to gross domestic product (“GDP”) as reported by the International 
Financial Statistics (“IFS”).  Similar to Allayannis et al. (2003), we measure exchange rate risk 
by calculating the ratio of the short-term lending rate in the subsidiary country to the short-term 
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lending rate in the parent country as provided by the World Bank.
15
  Additionally, as a 
robustness check, we use sovereign yield spread as an alternative exchange rate risk measure. 
In order to analyze these factors in our multivariate analysis, we create relative variables 
for each proxy by dividing its value in the subsidiary country by its value in the parent country.  
The resulting variables are Relative Common Law, Relative Rule of Law, Relative Deposits / 
GDP, and Relative Short Term Interest.  We present a detailed description of these variables in 
the Appendix. 
The fourth column of Table 7 presents the results of a regression in which we control for 
the effects of these variables on the debt location decision of multinational corporations in 
addition to the variables presented in the other two columns.  Even controlling for these country 
variables, our tax variables maintain their statistical significance. 
Both the relative common law and rule of law variables are positive and significant.
16
  
Parents located in civil (common) law countries are more (less) likely to issue debt through 
subsidiaries located in common (civil) law countries.  Moreover, parent located in countries with 
poor (good) law enforcement and less (more) developed debt market are more likely to issue 
debt internationally (domestically).  These results complement those of Desai et al. (2004), who 
                                                 
15
 It might be argued that a short-lending rate variable could also proxy for debt market timing. Because of interest 
rate parity considerations, empirical proxies of currency exchange differentials might also be viewed as proxies of 
international interest rate differentials.  While we do not exclude interest rate market timing when interpreting our 
short-term interest variable, previous studies have shown that exchange rate risk is a stronger driver of foreign debt 
location.  Henderson et al. (2006) do not find significant empirical support for the hypothesis that firms issue debt 
abroad to take advantage of lower foreign interest rates.  Conversely. Bartram et al. (2010) find that financial 
currency hedging with foreign debt is one of the main methods adopted by firms to decrease exchange rate exposure. 
16
 The variance inflation factors of the common law and rule of law variables are less than two, establishing an 
absence of multicollinearity between these two variables. 
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find that foreign subsidiaries domiciled in poor creditor protection countries issue less external 
debt and borrow more internally.   
The coefficient of the Relative Short Term Interest variable suggests that multinational 
companies are more likely to issue debt in countries with high exchange rate risk, measured by 
the relative subsidiary-to-parent country short-term interest rate.  This result may indicate that 
foreign debt issuance is used as an exchange rate risk hedging strategy.  Multinational firms that 
generate a significant amount of operating cash flows from foreign operations may attempt to 
hedge the exchange rate risk of these cash inflows by issuing foreign currency debt through their 
foreign subsidiaries (Shapiro (1984), Bartram et al. (2010)).
17
  The sign of the coefficient does 
not support, instead, the conjecture that firms time the debt market by issuing debt in countries 
with lower interest rates. 
In the last column of Table 7 we report a logistic regression that includes the number of 
foreign subsidiaries owned by our sample firms.  The number of foreign subsidiaries is a proxy 
for investing opportunities in foreign countries.  Corporations are likely to match investing 
opportunities with local financing, and therefore we expect that firms with a larger number of 
foreign subsidiaries will issue more foreign debt.  Consistent with this conjecture the number of 
foreign subsidiary variable is positive and significant.  The inclusion of this variable does not 
change the sign and significance of the tax and country variables with the exclusion of the 
relative Dividend Relief variable. In this specification the Dividend Relief variable is negative 
and significant consistent with our hypothesis on dividend imputation and relief systems. 
                                                 
17
 As further explained in Section 5, we replicate our regressions with a relative sovereign yield spread variable as 
an alternative proxy for exchange rate risk.  Our results do not significantly change. 
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We also assess the economic significance of the tax-related variables on a firm’s debt 
location choice for the specification presented in the last column.  An increase in the Relative 
Debt Tax Gain variable from its 25
th
 to its 75
th
 percentile, holding all the other variables at their 
median values, increases the probability of issuing debt through a foreign subsidiary by 7.15%.  
If a subsidiary is located in a country with dividend imputation (dividend relief) while the parent 
is headquartered in a country with a classical dividend tax system, the probability of issuing debt 
though the foreign subsidiary is 16.11% (3.32%) lower.  Companies with parents domiciled in 
countries which adopt a tax exemption system are 18.23% more likely to issue debt through 
foreign subsidiaries when the foreign country has a higher corporate tax rate. 
4.2.   Multivariate Analysis of the Proportion of Debt Located in Foreign Subsidiaries 
Table 7 presents the results of Tobit regressions.  The dependent variable in the 
regressions is the ratio of the amount of debt issued by all foreign subsidiaries of a company 
located in a specific country to the total amount of debt issued by the multinational firm in a 
fiscal year.  Since companies issue debt only in a limited set of foreign countries, the dependent 
variable is left-censored at zero.  We estimate a Tobit regression to account for the censoring of 
the dependent variable. 
While the logistic regressions presented in Table 7 examine the binary choice between 
issuing debt domestically or abroad, the Tobit regressions of Table 8 examine the corporate 
choice concerning the allocation of total debt issued each year across each foreign country where 
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subsidiaries are located.
18
  Unlike in our logistic analysis, here we are able examine the impact of 
withholding taxes on the allocation choice of debt issued abroad.  This is possible because the 
regression examines the allocation of debt issued in foreign countries rather than the decision of 
whether to issue domestically or internationally.   
The first column of Table 8 examines tax-based incentives of debt location in 
multinational corporations.  The positive coefficient on Debt Tax Gain is consistent with the 
view that firms are more likely to issue larger quantities of debt through a subsidiary in countries 
where personal and corporate taxes provide a higher tax advantage of debt.  The relative 
dividend imputation and dividend relief variables are negative and significant.  Multinational 
corporations issue larger quantities of debt through subsidiaries located in countries without 
dividend imputation of dividend relief rules where the after-tax cost of debt is relatively lower 
than the cost of equity. 
Consistent with our hypothesis that multinational corporations might be less likely to 
issue debt through subsidiaries located in countries characterized by high withholding tax rates 
on interest, the interest withholding variable is negative and significant.  Multinational firms 
issue larger quantities of debt in foreign countries with low or non-existing interest withholding 
taxes.  This result is consistent with the hypothesis that, since foreign withholding taxes on 
interest payments are in addition to domestic personal income taxes, investors may demand 
higher rates of return for investing in bonds issued by foreign companies, creating differences in 
                                                 
18
 We estimate these regressions for the sample of firms covered by Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations for which we 
have information on the total number of subsidiaries (independently on debt issuance) in each foreign country for 
each corporation. 
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borrowing costs associated with foreign and domestic debt offerings.  The coefficient of the 
Exemption System variable show that firms with parents domiciled in countries with a tax 
exemption system are issuing a larger quantity of debt through foreign subsidiaries domiciled in 
countries with higher corporate tax rates. 
As in Table 7, in the second column of Table 8 we expand our Tobit regression to control 
for the possible influence of issue-level characteristics and firm-level characteristics that may 
impact the corporate debt location decision.  The results for the control variables are consistent 
with those presented in the first column of Table 7.   The tax-based variables significant in the 
first column also maintain their significance when controlling for firm and issue-level variables. 
However, different from the results in the first column, the dividend withholding variable is 
positive and significant.  This result is consistent with the hypothesis that firms issue larger 
amount of debt through foreign subsidiaries located in countries with higher withholding taxes 
on dividends.  The subsidiary country can levy taxes on outgoing dividend payments used by the 
subsidiary to transfer income to the parent company, leading to additional incentives to issue 
debt through subsidiaries located in high dividend withholding rate countries. 
Huizinga et al. (2008) do not find that dividend withholding rates have a significant effect 
on debt location decisions by multinational corporations.  The difference between the results of 
our study and those of Huizinga et al. (2008) might derive from the difference in the two 
samples.  While Huizinga et al. (2008) limit their analysis to European companies, we extend our 
analysis to all non-U.S. firms.  Since our sample also comprises non-European firms, our 
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dividend withholding variable has a larger variability across countries, which, in turn, increases 
the power of our test.   
In addition to the tax-based variables and the firm and issue-level controls, the third 
column of Table 8 also controls for the effects of legal and institutional variables on the debt 
location decision of multinational corporations.  The relative rule of law variable is positive and 
significant, suggesting that multinational corporations issue a larger quantity of debt in countries 
with better rule of law.  The coefficients for the proxies for credit market depth and exchange 
rate risk (Relative Deposits / GDP and Relative Short Term Interest, respectively) are not 
significant.  These results, in combination with the significance of these variables in Table 7, 
suggest that even though multinational firms are more likely to issue debt in foreign countries 
where debt markets are more developed and in countries with higher risk of currency 
depreciation, the relative quantity of debt issued through subsidiaries in different foreign 
countries is not significantly affected by the specific debt market development and exchange risk 
of each single country. 
The last column of Table 8 presents the results of a regression that also includes the 
number of subsidiaries each firm has in each foreign country.  The coefficient of this variable is 
positive and significant, offering evidence that companies issue larger quantity of debt in 
countries with a larger number of subsidiaries where investing opportunities are more numerous.  
For the remaining variables, the results of this regression are consistent with those presented in 
the other columns. 
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5.  Robustness Tests 
5.1.  Exclusion of Japanese Multinational Corporations and U.S. Subsidiaries 
As shown in Table 1, out of the 4,998 issues by parent companies in our sample, 2,341 
(46.8%) are from Japan.  To verify that our results are not exclusively driven by Japanese 
corporations, in Table 9 we replicate the analysis presented in Table 7 excluding parent 
companies domiciled in Japan.  All the coefficients of the tax-related variables maintain the same 
sign and significance as in Table 7.  Overall, these results show that our results are not driven by 
Japanese corporations. 
As Japanese corporations represent a large portion of the parent sample, U.S. subsidiaries 
of non-U.S. companies corresponds to a sizeable part of all issuing foreign subsidiaries (29%).  
When we replicate the analysis of Table 7 excluding U.S. subsidiaries of non-U.S. corporations, 
we find that the tax-related results of this study are not driven by U.S.-located foreign 
subsidiaries. 
5.2.  Alternative Proxies 
The multivariate analyses presented in Tables 7 and 8 comprise a limited selection of 
proxies for country legal protection, debt market development, and exchange rate risk.  We 
check the robustness of our results by estimating similar regressions with different proxies for 
these variables. 
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The level of corruption in a country provides a proxy for the threat of expropriation of 
investor rights and the integrity of the legal system.  Therefore, corruption can be used as an 
alternative proxy for rule of law (see, for example, Fan et al. (2008)).  When we estimate our 
regressions substituting the rule of law variable with the corruption index provided by 
Transparency International, our tax-related results do not change.  Another proxy for rule of law 
and legal enforcement is the legality index created by Berkowitz et al. (2003).  This index is 
derived by the summary statistic from a principal component analysis of five measures of legal 
enforcement:  1) effectiveness of the judiciary, 2) rule of law, 3) risk of contract repudiation, 4) 
absence of corruption, and 5) risk of expropriation.  Our multivariate results are robust to the 
substitution of rule of law with the legality index. 
In Tables 7 and 8, the ratio of a country’s net deposits to GDP proxies for the depth and 
development of debt markets in different countries.  An alternative proxy for debt market 
development is the ratio of aggregate debt (sum of bank debt of the private sector and 
outstanding non-financial bonds) to GDP (see, for example, La Porta et al. (1997)).  We re-
estimate our regressions with aggregate debt to GDP instead of net deposits to GDP.  Again, our 
tax-related results are robust to this change in the debt market development proxy. 
Finally, in our main regressions, we measure exchange rate risk by calculating the ratio of 
the short-term lending rate in the subsidiary country to the short-term lending rate in the parent 
country as provided by the World Bank.  A possible alternative to this variable is the sovereign 
yield spread proxied by the country credit rating provided by Institutional Investor.  Our 
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multivariate results are robust to the substitution of lending rate differential with country credit 
rating differential. 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper examines the external debt financing choices of multinational firms by 
examining the incremental debt decision of companies headquartered in 23 countries spanning 
ten years (from 1995 to 2004).  This study benefits from the broadest international dataset and 
the most complete set of tax-related variables and institutional controls used in the international 
capital structure literature.  Our empirical analysis allows us to provide new powerful tests of the 
ability of multinational firms to arbitrage differences in international tax rates, while controlling 
for firm-specific and country-level factors, such as the level of debt market development, legal 
regimes, and exchange rate risk. 
Unlike previous studies on international corporate debt decisions (e.g., Desai et al. (2004) 
and Huizinga et al. (2008)), we examine the firm’s incremental debt issuance decision.  Our 
novel approach in the context of multinational corporate structure decisions links the borrowing 
decision of the firm with variables measured just prior to the debt issuance, allowing analysis of 
the effect of time-variation in tax factors on the debt location choice.  Moreover, this approach 
provides more power to identify effects that are determined at the margin, such as taxes. 
Our results provide strong support for tax-based theories of debt location.  Consistent 
with our predictions, we find that parent companies that operate in favorable (unfavorable) tax 
environments for corporate debt (measured by a variant of the Miller (1977) gains-to-leverage 
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ratio) are less (more) likely to issue through foreign subsidiaries located in countries with tax 
rates less (more) favorable for corporate debt.  We also show that parent companies domiciled in 
countries that employ dividend imputation or dividend relief are more likely to locate debt 
through foreign subsidiaries in countries that employ the classical dividend tax system.  
Moreover, we show that corporations with parents domiciled in countries with a tax exemption 
system on repatriated profits are more likely to issue debt through foreign subsidiaries in high 
corporate tax countries than companies with parents domiciled in countries with a tax credit 
system.  Finally, we find that multinational corporations issue larger quantities of debt through 
subsidiaries located in countries that have low withholding taxes on interest income and high 
withholding taxes on dividends with the country where the parent company resides. 
Our results of the tax effects on international corporate debt location decisions are robust 
to issue and firm-level characteristics, proxies for the development of debt markets, exchange 
rate risk, and differences in legal regimes.  Overall our paper presents strong evidence that a 
wide array of tax-based incentives has a significant influence on multinational firms’ debt 
location choice.   Arena (2010) 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Aggregate Debt/GDP Ratio of the sum of bank debt of the private sector and outstanding non-
financial bonds to GDP. 
 
International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund 
Asset Maturity Gross PPE divided by total assets times gross PPE divided by depreciation Global Vantage 
Asset Tangibility Fraction of fixed assets calculated as gross plant, property, and equipment 
divided by total assets. 
Global Vantage 
Capital Gain Tax Rate Country capital gain tax rate. Price Waterhouse’s Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary  
Common Law  Indicator variable equal to one if the subsidiary country is a common law 
country as defined by La Porta et al. (1998) and zero otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Convertible Indicator variable equal to one when the issue is convertible debt. SDC 
Corporate Tax Rate Country corporate tax rate. PwC’s Corporate Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary and 
Individual Taxes a Worldwide 
Summary  
Creditor Right Add one when (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditor’s 
consent of minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured 
creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the 
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured 
creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result fron 
the disposition of the assets of the bankrupt firm; (4) the debtor does not 
retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization.  This index ranges from zero to four. 
 
 
La Porta et al. (1997) 
Debt Tax Gain Tax advantage of debt: 1-((1- Tc)/(1-Tp)) where Tc is the corporate tax 
rate, and Tp is the personal tax rate on interest income. 
PwC’s Corporate Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary and 
Individual Taxes a Worldwide 
Summary  
Deposits / GDP Ratio of the country’s deposits to GDP. International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund 
Dividend Imputation System An indicator equal to one if the country adopts the dividend imputation tax 
system, zero otherwise. 
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2003) 
Dividend Relief System An indicator equal to one if the country adopts the dividend relief tax 
system, zero otherwise. 
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2003) 
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Dividend Withholding Tax 
Rate 
Dividend withholding tax rate between the subsidiary country and the 
parent country. Whenever available, we use the maximum withholding 
rate specified by the treaty in the country in which the non-resident 
subsidiary operates.  If no treaty exists, we use the maximum withholding 
rate for non-treaty countries. 
PwC’s Corporate Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary and 
Individual Taxes a Worldwide 
Summary  
Effective Tax Rate Corporate taxes paid divided by taxable income. Global Vantage 
 
Exemption System An indicator equal to one if the parent country adopts an exemption 
system and the subsidiary country has a corporate tax rate higher than the 
parent country, and zero otherwise.   
 
PwC’s Corporate Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary and 
Income Tax Rate Country personal income tax rate. PwC’s Individual Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary  
Interest Coverage Interest coverage calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, amortization 
and depreciation divided by interest expense. 
Global Vantage 
Interest Withholding Tax Rate Interest withholding tax rate between the subsidiary country and the parent 
country. Whenever available, we use the maximum withholding rate 
specified by the treaty in the country in which the non-resident subsidiary 
operates.  If no treaty exists, we use the maximum withholding rate for 
non-treaty countries. 
PwC’s Corporate Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary and 
Individual Taxes a Worldwide 
Summary  
Leverage  Total debt divided by total assets. Global Vantage 
Loan Indicator variable equal to one when the issue is a bank loan. SDC 
Log Assets Natural logarithm of total assets. Global Vantage 
Log Maturity Natural logarithm of debt maturity expressed in years. For firms that issue 
multiple contracts in a single year, we calculate a duration weighted 
maturity using the individual debt proceeds amount as the weights.  
SDC 
Log Principal Natural logarithm of the debt issue dollar amount. For firms that issue 
multiple contracts in a single year, we aggregate the proceeds amount 
across similar contracts. 
SDC 
Market to Book Market capitalization divided by the book value of equity. Global Vantage 
Miller Gains-to-Leverage Miller (1977) gains-to-leverage formula.  The Miller (1977) gains-to-
leverage formula is: 1-((1- Tc)(1-Te)/(1-Tp)) where Tc is the corporate tax 
rate, Te is the tax rate on capital gains, and Tp is the tax rate on interest 
income. 
PwC’s Corporate Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary and 
Individual Taxes a Worldwide 
Summary  
 
N  Foreign Subs Number of foreign subsidiaries owned by each corporation LexisNexis Corporate 
Affiliations 
N  Subs in Country Number of subsidiaries owned by a corporation in each foreign country LexisNexis Corporate 
Affiliations 
41 
 
Relative Common Law Indicator variable equal to one if the subsidiary country is a common law 
country and the parent country is not a common law country, zero if either 
or neither country is a common law country, and minus one of the 
subsidiary country is not a common law country and the parent country is 
a common law country. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Relative Creditor Rights Indicator variable equal to one if the subsidiary country has more creditor 
rights than the parent country, equal to zero if both countries have the 
same number of creditor rights, and equal to minus one if the subsidiary 
country has less creditor rights than the parent country. 
La Porta et al. (1997) 
Relative Debt Tax Gain Difference between the Debt Tax Gain variable for the subsidiary country 
and for the parent country.   
PwC’s Corporate Taxes a 
Worldwide Summary and 
Individual Taxes a Worldwide 
Summary  
Relative Deposits / GDP Ratio of the subsidiary country's deposits to GDP divided by the ratio of 
the parent country's deposits to GDP. 
International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund 
Relative Dividend Imputation An indicator equal to one if the subsidiary country adopts the dividend 
imputation tax system and the parent country does not, equal to zero if 
either or neither country adopts the dividend imputation tax system, and 
equal to minus one if the subsidiary country does not adopt the dividend 
imputation tax system but the parent country does. 
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2003) 
Relative Dividend Relief An indicator equal to one if the subsidiary country adopts the dividend 
imputation tax system and the parent country does not, equal to zero if 
either or neither countries adopt the dividend imputation tax system, and 
equal to minus one if the subisidiary country does not adopt the dividend 
imputation tax system but the parent country does. 
 
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2003) 
Relative Rule of Law Indicator variable equal to one if the subsidiary country has a higher rule 
of law score than the parent country, zero if both countries have the same 
rule of law score, and minus one if the subsidiary country has a lower rule 
of law score than the parent country. 
International Country Risk Guide 
Relative Short Term Interest Ratio of the short-term lending rate in the subsidiary country to the short-
term lending rate in the parent country. 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
ROA EBITDA divided by total assets. Global Vantage 
ROA St. Dev. Standard deviation of EBITDA divided by total assets for the previous 10 
years (or for all available years if fewer than 10). 
Global Vantage 
Rule of Law Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Average of the 
months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 
1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and 
order. 
International Country Risk Guide 
Short-Term Interest Rate Country short-term lending rate. World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
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Sub/Parent Leverage Ratio of issuing (domestic or foreign) subsidiary leverage to parent 
leverage.  If the issuing entity is the parent, the variable assumes the value 
of one. 
SDC 
Sub/Parent Loss Indicator variable equal to one when the issuing (domestic or foreign) 
subsidiary posts a loss in the year preceding the issue while the parent 
posts positive net income, equal to minus one when the issuing subsidiary 
posts positive net income in the year preceding the issue while the parent 
posts a loss, and equal to zero when both subsidiary and parent post net 
income or a loss. If the issuing entity is the parent, the variable assumes 
the value of zero. 
SDC 
Sub/Parent ROA Ratio of issuing (domestic or foreign) subsidiary return on assets to parent 
return on assets.  If the issuing entity is the parent, the variable assumes 
the value of one.  Return on assets is calculated as EBITDA over assets. 
SDC 
Total Assets Total assets of the firm expressed in millions of dollars calculated at the 
end of the fiscal year preceding the debt issue. 
Global Vantage 
Total Sales Total sales of the firm expressed in millions of dollars calculated at the 
end of the fiscal year preceding the debt issue. 
Global Vantage 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Parent Country and Issuing Entity 
 
 
  All Issuers   Headquarters   
Domestic 
Subsidiary   
Foreign 
Subsidiary 
                
Japan 3384 (1023)  2341 (959)  404 (137)  639 (77) 
United Kingdom 743 (264)  486 (225)  158 (71)  99 (42) 
South Korea 594 (81)  341 (71)  197 (30)  56 (15) 
Canada 530 (177)  358 (162)  123 (32)  49 (23) 
Germany 410 (62)  85 (47)  72 (19)  253 (30) 
France 357 (95)  203 (84)  108 (22)  46 (20) 
Taiwan 335 (77)  201 (75)  101 (22)  33 (15) 
Australia 222 (83)  129 (64)  59 (26)  34 (16) 
Hong Kong 222 (86)  82 (49)  101 (45)  39 (12) 
Switzerland 190 (45)  66 (34)  22 (11)  102 (20) 
Spain 157 (34)  49 (26)  35 (13)  73 (10) 
India 149 (41)  94 (37)  48 (9)  7 (4) 
Thailand 149 (51)  111 (47)  37 (15)  1 (1) 
Mexico 143 (35)  90 (31)  49 (14)  4 (2) 
Netherlands 134 (43)  80 (32)  23 (13)  31 (17) 
Singapore 126 (43)  55 (31)  49 (14)  22 (6) 
Indonesia 89 (43)  49 (35)  32 (11)  8 (6) 
Brazil 87 (28)  53 (25)  31 (13)  3 (2) 
Malaysia 81 (51)  45 (33)  28 (16)  8 (7) 
Sweden 71 (16)  25 (12)  30 (8)  16 (4) 
Norway 45 (23)  24 (17)  12 (9)  9 (3) 
Italy 41 (19)  15 (14)  11 (6)  15 (4) 
Finland 28 (17)  16 (12)  11 (5)  1 (1) 
Total 8287 (2437)   4998 (2122)   1741 (561)   1548 (338) 
 
This table provides information on the number of issues and number of issuers (in parenthesis) by country of origin 
of the parent company and by issuing entity (e.g., parent versus domestic and foreign subsidiary issues). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics by Foreign Subsidiary Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table provides information on the number of foreign-subsidiary issues and issuers (in parenthesis) by country of 
the foreign subsidiary. 
  Foreign Subsidiary 
 Issues Issuers 
United States 547 (102) 
Netherlands 249 (44) 
United Kingdom 179 (20) 
Australia 57 (16) 
Cayman Islands 52 (15) 
Singapore 33 (5) 
Hong Kong 32 (10) 
Canada 29 (6) 
Luxembourg 26 (10) 
Brazil 22 (3) 
Indonesia 21 (5) 
China 20 (9) 
Belgium 19 (3) 
France 18 (6) 
Thailand 18 (6) 
Chile 18 (7) 
Malaysia 16 (4) 
Japan 15 (4) 
Mexico 12 (3) 
Jersey 12 (6) 
Bermuda 12 (2) 
Germany 11 (3) 
South Korea 9 (2) 
Spain 9 (8) 
Others 112 (39) 
   
Total 1548 (338) 
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Table 3 
Univariate Analysis – Issue Characteristics 
 
    Parent Dom. Sub. For. Sub.   p-values 
Principal ($M) 
Mean 243.7 276.9 366.6  0.045 
Median 96 118 112  0.092 
N 4995 1741 1548   
         
Duration 
Mean 5.5 5.0 4.6  0.068 
Median 5 4 4  0.088 
N 3077 779 691   
         
Maturity 
Mean 7.5 7.6 10.7  0.039 
Median 5 5 5  0.375 
N 4993 1741 1547   
         
Coupon (annual %) 
Mean 4.1 5.6 4.3  0.766 
Median 3.0 5.1 3.9  0.352 
N 2806 749 673   
         
Yield to Maturity (%) 
Mean 4.2 5.5 4.7  0.382 
Median 3.1 5.0 3.9  0.277 
N 3224 1064 887     
 
 
This table presents issue characteristics by issuing entity (i.e., parent, domestic subsidiary, or foreign subsidiary). 
Debt issues are aggregated by issuer, year, type, country, and marketplace. The yield to maturity of loans is 
calculated by adding monthly LIBOR to the average loan spread. Duration, maturity, coupon, and yield to maturity 
are a principal-weighted average of the aggregated debt issues.  The p-values refer to two-sample t-tests of the mean 
and Wilcoxon tests of the median between issues by domestic firms (both parents and domestic subsidiaries) and 
foreign subsidiaries. 
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Table 4 
Univariate Analysis – Country-Level Tax Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table provides issue-level summary statistics for tax-based incentive variables. For each external debt issue, the table reports 
means and medians by issuer entity.  The first column identifies parent-level issues and tabulates the summary statistics using 
parent country information.  The second column reports parent country information for external debt issued by subsidiaries 
located in the same country of the parent.  The next two columns identify external debt issued by foreign subsidiaries and provide 
summary statistics using both country-level information from the parent country and the foreign subsidiary country, respectively.  
The p-values refer to two-sample t-tests of the mean and Wilcoxon tests of the median of country-level information between the 
parent and foreign subsidiary countries for external debt issued by foreign subsidiaries.  All variables are defined in the 
Appendix.  
    Parent 
Dom. 
Sub. For. Sub. For. Sub.     
       
Parent 
Country 
Variables 
Sub. 
Country 
Variables   p-values 
Corporate Tax Rate Mean 32.56 30.74 33.45 31.40  0.238 
 Median 33.00 30.00 35.00 35.00  0.421 
        
Income Tax Rate Mean 40.30 38.38 44.03 36.75  0.006 
 Median 40.00 40.00 48.09 39.60  0.009 
        
Capital Gain Tax Rate Mean 21.77 18.08 17.44 17.60  0.634 
 Median 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00  0.749 
 
Debt Tax Gain Mean -0.14 -0.14 -0.21 -0.10  0.000 
 Median -0.12 -0.15 -0.25 -0.08  0.000 
 
Miller Gains-to-Leverage Mean 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.10  0.000 
 Median 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.14  0.000 
        
Dividend Imputation System Mean 0.33 0.42 0.40 0.22  0.004 
 Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.068 
        
Dividend Relief System Mean 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.09  0.104 
 Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.243 
        
Dividend Witholding Tax Rate Mean na na na 11.77  na 
 Median na na na 15.00  na 
        
Interest Witholding Tax Rate Mean na na na 7.60  na 
  Median na na na 10.00   na 
47 
 
 
Table 5 
Univariate Analysis – Firm-Level Variables 
 
 
      
Parent and 
Dom. Sub. 
For. Sub.   p-values 
Total Assets 
Mean  10797 42884  0.000 
Median  2695 29552  0.000 
N   6263 1417    
Total Sales 
Mean  9250 45302   0.000 
Median  2070 26755  0.000 
N  6249 1412     
Leverage 
Mean   0.65 0.73  0.078 
Median  0.66 0.76  0.053 
N   6263 1415   
ROA 
Mean  0.09 0.09   0.856 
Median  0.09 0.09  0.933 
N  6262 1417     
ROA st dev 
Mean   0.06 0.04  0.425 
Median  0.04 0.03  0.569 
N   6262 1417   
Interest 
Coverage 
Mean  7.77 4.72   0.043 
Median  3.22 2.97  0.164 
N  6195 1405     
Asset Tangibility 
Mean   0.40 0.31  0.034 
Median  0.37 0.29  0.048 
N   6263 1417   
Market to Book 
Mean  7.81 4.20   0.080 
Median  1.52 1.52  0.695 
N  4344 715     
Effective Tax 
Rate 
Mean   0.29 0.20  0.059 
Median  0.33 0.35  0.478 
N   6258 1417   
Asset Maturity 
Mean  26.56 10.73   0.027 
Median  12.48 8.32  0.048 
N   4471 1023     
 
This table provides mean, median, number of observations, and p-value of two-sample t-tests of the mean and 
Wilcoxon tests of the median for the firm-level control variables.  External debt issues are identified on the basis of 
the country of the entity that offered the security, i.e., domestic firm (parent or subsidiary), or foreign subsidiary.  
All firm-level controls are measured using parent-level information available in the year preceding the debt issue.  
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 6 
Correlation Table 
 
 
This table presents the correlations among the variables used in the multivariate analysis. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
  
Log 
Assets 
Leverage ROA 
ROA 
St. Dev. 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
Log 
Principal 
Log 
Maturity 
Convertible Loan 
Relative 
Corp Tax 
Rate 
Relative 
Cap Gain 
Tax 
Relative 
Per Tax 
Rate 
Relative 
Debt Tax 
Gain  
Relative 
Miller 
Gains-to-
Leverage 
Relative 
Dividend 
Imputation 
Relative 
Dividend 
Relief 
Relative 
Common 
Law 
Relative 
Rule of 
Law 
Relative 
Deposits / 
GDP 
Relative 
Short 
Term 
Interest 
N 
Foreign 
Subs 
Exemption 
System 
Log Assets 1.000                       
Leverage 0.426 1.000                      
ROA 0.072 -0.177 1.000                     
ROA St. Dev. -0.198 -0.086 -0.174 1.000                    
Asset Tangibility 0.028 -0.095 0.124 -0.057 1.000                   
Effective Tax Rate -0.001 0.010 0.009 -0.011 -0.012 1.000                  
Log Principal 0.465 0.080 0.149 -0.098 0.154 -0.007 1.000                 
Log Maturity 0.091 -0.034 0.036 -0.043 0.131 0.015 0.316 1.000                
Convertible -0.253 -0.110 -0.145 0.121 -0.111 0.014 -0.088 0.020 1.000               
Loan -0.192 -0.086 0.057 0.000 0.021 -0.019 -0.012 -0.181 -0.261 1.000              
Relative Corp Tax Rate -0.022 -0.079 0.025 0.032 0.037 0.025 0.085 -0.046 -0.017 0.067 1.000             
Relative Cap Gain Tax -0.117 -0.034 -0.002 0.012 0.051 0.047 0.036 0.014 0.054 0.039 0.202 1.000            
Relative Per Tax Rate -0.154 -0.151 0.028 0.036 0.091 0.015 0.039 0.022 0.009 0.134 0.569 0.316 1.000           
Relative Debt Tax Gain  0.248 0.161 -0.020 -0.030 -0.115 0.000 0.021 -0.065 -0.060 -0.121 0.132 -0.347 -0.634 1.000          
Relative Miller Gains-to-Leverage 0.207 0.095 0.007 -0.020 -0.064 0.011 0.086 -0.050 -0.033 -0.059 0.295 0.630 -0.255 0.655 1.000         
Relative Dividend Imputation -0.067 0.010 -0.069 0.001 -0.059 0.005 -0.116 0.009 0.019 -0.013 -0.093 0.433 0.098 -0.242 -0.048 1.000        
Relative Dividend Relief 0.085 0.049 -0.018 -0.015 -0.040 -0.022 0.011 -0.025 -0.008 0.000 -0.288 -0.199 -0.317 0.115 0.046 -0.190 1.000       
Relative Common Law 0.349 0.199 -0.037 -0.059 -0.159 -0.005 0.044 0.004 -0.089 -0.142 -0.176 0.031 -0.323 0.334 0.400 0.127 0.077 1.000      
Relative Rule of Law 0.030 0.036 -0.016 0.015 -0.022 0.000 0.023 -0.018 -0.032 -0.077 0.202 -0.208 -0.024 0.161 0.093 -0.042 -0.122 0.254 1.000     
Relative Deposits / GDP -0.051 -0.028 -0.007 0.013 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.047 0.011 0.023 0.059 0.026 0.000 0.119 0.036 0.374 -0.181 0.188 1.000    
Relative Short Term Interest 0.178 0.099 -0.024 -0.033 -0.059 0.001 -0.033 0.032 -0.051 -0.042 -0.311 -0.039 -0.211 0.106 0.039 0.091 0.041 0.279 -0.120 -0.094 1.000   
N Foreign Subs 0.522 0.184 0.019 -0.118 -0.266 0.007 0.129 -0.006 -0.074 -0.141 0.006 -0.103 -0.172 0.248 0.307 -0.093 0.062 0.380 0.008 -0.078 0.154 1.000  
Exemption System 
-0.014 -0.176 0.146 0.032 0.051 -0.007 0.157 0.065 -0.040 0.128 0.088 -0.016 0.088 -0.004 0.124 -0.207 0.021 -0.059 -0.052 0.065 -0.065 0.109 1.000 
49 
 
Table 7 
Logistic Analysis of the Corporate Debt Location Choice  
between Parent and Foreign Subsidiary 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -2.04 -6.06 -7.08 -24.49 -24.14 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Assets  0.50 0.49 0.24 0.08 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.272) 
Leverage  -0.40 -0.43 -1.24 -1.22 
  (0.198) (0.194) (0.029) (0.067) 
ROA  1.70 1.61 1.82 1.52 
  (0.021) (0.033) (0.107) (0.278) 
ROA St. Dev.  -2.01 -2.62 0.05 1.09 
  (0.010) (0.001) (0.934) (0.466) 
Asset Tangibility  -1.60 -1.65 -1.62 -0.50 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.336) 
Effective Tax Rate  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.521) (0.559) (0.274) (0.252) 
Sub/Parent Leverage   -0.32 0.85 0.73 
   (0.407) (0.133) (0.130) 
Sub/Parent ROA   0.26 0.14 0.63 
   (0.010) (0.019) (0.000) 
Sub/Parent Loss   0.92 0.58 -0.06 
   (0.314) (0.556) (0.967) 
Log Principal  -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.083) (0.111) 
Log Maturity  0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 
  (0.177) (0.147) (0.675) (0.671) 
Convertible  -1.15 -1.10 -0.82 -0.50 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.294) 
Loan  0.25 0.23 0.45 0.50 
  (0.027) (0.037) (0.016) (0.019) 
Relative Debt Tax Gain  10.07 2.54 1.77 2.33 1.84 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.05) 
Relative Dividend Imputation -0.81 -1.48 -1.39 -6.02 -6.15 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Dividend Relief 0.55 0.21 0.87 -0.67 -1.33 
 (0.260) (0.673) (0.478) (0.323) (0.083) 
Exemption System 0.23 0.65 0.11 1.38 1.40 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.128) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Common Law    3.70 3.55 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Rule of Law    5.16 5.03 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Deposits / GDP    2.23 2.12 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Short Term Interest    8.88 8.76 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
N Foreign Subs     0.01 
         (0.000) 
N 8248 7546 7546 6915 4756 
Pseudo R
2
 0.20 0.42 0.46 0.58 0.62 
This table presents logistic regressions of the corporate debt location choice.  The dependent variable is zero if the debt is issued 
by either the parent or a domestic subsidiary and one if it is issued by a foreign subsidiary.  Across each regression model, we 
control for year and firm fixed effects.  We avoid dropping observations with missing Sub/Parent variables by setting 
the missing variables to zero and introducing unreported indicator variables set to unity for the missing observations. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  Statistically significant coefficients, at a 
minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold.  
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Table 8 
Tobit Analysis of the Amount of Corporate Debt Issued  
in Different Foreign Subsidiary Countries 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -2.19 -4.10 -4.96 -5.18 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Assets  0.16 0.20 0.16 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  0.30 0.22 0.73 
  (0.076) (0.316) (0.005) 
ROA  -0.22 -0.53 0.48 
  (0.537) (0.331) (0.442) 
ROA St. Dev.  1.74 1.23 1.76 
  (0.000) (0.036) (0.006) 
Asset Tangibility  0.67 0.60 0.31 
  (0.204) (0.198) (0.130) 
Effective Tax Rate  -0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (0.144) (0.790) (0.658) 
Debt Tax Gain R 0.28 0.21 0.16 0.19 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.082) (0.049) 
Dividend Imputation R -0.15 -0.17 -0.42 -0.23 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend Relief R -0.30 -0.35 -0.70 -0.54 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend Withholding 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.361) (0.042) (0.002) (0.040) 
Interest Withholding -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Exemption System 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.19 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.088) (0.019) 
Common Law R   -0.04 -0.09 
   (0.504) (0.310) 
Rule of Law R   1.16 1.19 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits / GDP R   -0.28 -0.45 
   (0.367) (0.288) 
Short Term Interest R   -0.42 -0.36 
   (0.157) (0.271) 
N Subs in Country    0.04 
        (0.000) 
N (uncensored) 683 672 426 294 
Log-Likelihood -3039.6 -2908.0 -1733.3 -1127.8 
This table presents a Tobit regression of the amount of corporate debt issued in different foreign subsidiary countries.  The 
dependent variable is the ratio of the amount of debt issued by all foreign subsidiaries of a company located in a specific country 
to the total amount of debt issued by the corporation in a fiscal year.  Since companies issue debt only in a limited set of foreign 
countries, the dependent variable of the regression is left-censored at zero.  Across each regression model, we control for year 
and firm fixed effects.  All variables are defined in the Appendix.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  Statistically significant 
coefficients, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold. 
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Table 9 
Robustness Check - Logistic Analysis of the Corporate Debt Location Choice  
between Parent and Foreign Subsidiary excluding Japanese Corporations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This table presents logistic regressions of the corporate debt location choice.  The dependent variable is zero if the debt is issued by 
either the parent or a domestic subsidiary and one if it is issued by a foreign subsidiary.  Across each regression model, we control for 
year and firm fixed effects. We avoid dropping observations with missing Sub/Parent variables by setting the missing variables to zero 
and introducing unreported indicator variables set to unity for the missing observations. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  P-
values are reported in parenthesis.  Statistically significant coefficients, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -2.66 -6.86 -7.48 -21.75 -20.47 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Assets  0.42 0.40 0.26 0.09 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.229) 
Leverage  -0.20 -0.21 -1.16 -1.25 
  (0.618) (0.599) (0.042) (0.066) 
ROA  1.35 1.31 1.72 1.23 
  (0.140) (0.143) (0.142) (0.387) 
ROA St. Dev.  -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 1.11 
  (0.955) (0.963) (0.952) (0.421) 
Asset Tangibility  -1.29 -1.28 -1.72 -0.50 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.334) 
Effective Tax Rate  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.616) (0.635) (0.400) (0.410) 
Sub/Parent Leverage   -0.87 -0.35 -0.02 
   (0.027) (0.565) (0.978) 
Sub/Parent ROA   0.84 1.07 1.01 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Sub/Parent Loss   -0.47 -0.33 -0.94 
   (0.362) (0.768) (0.524) 
Log Principal  -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.056) (0.077) 
Log Maturity  0.13 0.15 0.09 0.11 
  (0.102) (0.041) (0.416) (0.405) 
Convertible  -0.02 -0.02 -0.54 -0.12 
  (0.886) (0.927) (0.230) (0.807) 
Loan  0.34 0.30 0.53 0.72 
  (0.014) (0.022) (0.004) (0.001) 
Relative Debt Tax Gain  1.95 1.44 0.83 0.73 1.12 
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.043) (0.044) (0.032) 
Relative Dividend Imputation -3.67 -2.98 -2.90 -5.84 -5.98 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Dividend Relief 1.18 0.98 1.06 -0.59 -1.37 
 (0.176) (0.311) (0.278) (0.356) (0.065) 
Exemption System 0.66 0.65 0.65 1.02 1.05 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Common Law    3.31 2.90 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Rule of Law    4.70 4.61 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Deposits / GDP    2.06 1.94 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Short Term Interest    7.20 6.44 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
N Foreign Subs     0.02 
          (0.000) 
N 4931 3744 3744 2693 2693 
Pseudo R
2
 0.26 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.49 
